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Human Rights Initiatives and the
Need for Alternatives to Refugee
Interdiction* *
Refugee law has fallen on hard times. Germany's political parties have
agreed to restrict the unique constitutional guarantee of asylum
installed in the republic's Grundgesetz in 1949. Canada's parliament
rushed to enact new restrictions in time for Christmas, bulldozing past
thoughtful objections tendered by a Senate committee. The United
States Coast Guard rings Haiti, not to enforce the OAS embargo against
its usurping rulers, but to keep small wooden boats bottled up lest
someone claim refugee status elsewhere in the hemisphere. The
Europe-without-borders supposedly created at the end of 1992 retained
its external borders, of course, and the Twelve's efforts to prevent arriv-
als through a common visa policy, enforced by carrier sanctions, or to
avoid forum-shopping by unsuccessful asylum seekers, have come under
sharp attack.' Bosnian refugees, even those newly released from Ser-
bian concentration camps, find a haven only with great difficulty. Repa-
triation gathers momentum in Central America, Southeast Asia, and
parts of Africa-sometimes a happy result of genuine progress in ending
regional conflicts, but often under conditions that raise real doubts
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about safety. Additionally, Burmese refugees, who have fled one of the
most defiantly abusive regimes left in the post-Cold War world, receive
only the most tenuous permission to stay in nearby countries.
A new era of refugee law and policy has broken decisively upon us.
Resistance to asylum seekers, suspicion of their motives, and anxiety
about the consequences of major flows will provide the dominant ani-
mating force for judges, administrators, legislators, and top political
leaders for the foreseeable future. This is the grim reality.
Still, the picture is not wholly bleak. In absolute terms, record high
numbers of people are being shielded from immediate return. The
world community has rallied, despite the grumbling, to spend more than
ever on care and maintenance of asylum seekers and refugees. And per-
haps some unintended benefits are possible as an outgrowth of the new
public resistance and anxiety. These public reactions might-just
might-help lift refugee policy debates out of some well-worn ruts.
They could force the serious consideration of novel responses to the
threats and needs that uproot people from their homes. Additionally,
they might expose long-submerged humanitarian weaknesses in classical
refugee law, especially its "exilic bias, '" 2 which has obscured the pos-
sibilities and responsibilities for supporting human rights improvements
in the home country.
Whether a beneficial new policy can be realized depends on the
response to the new resistance. The last two years have given us two
examples that mark out the poles of non-"exilic" policy, two paradigms
showing either creative or destructive new ways to deal with impending
refugee flows, if the political climate dictates that simply welcoming the
new arrivals in the haven state is not possible. In April 1991, the world
community responded to a refugee crisis on the Turkish border by inter-
vening in northern Iraq, enforcing sufficient safety to enable Kurdish
refugee families to return home. At the other extreme, in May 1992,
President Bush ordered the interdiction of Haitian boats and return of
all passengers, with no attention whatsoever to their refugee claims.
This solution to a political problem during an election year reduced
public and media concerns about the issue to such a degree that Ameri-
can pressure for democratic restoration in Haiti dropped noticeably.
Both stories, Haiti and Kurdistan, are incomplete, and each could
possibly reverse course and confound this categorization. But for now,
interdiction and intervention mark out paradigmatic alternative policy
2. This evocative phrase was first used, so far as I know, by Gervase Coles in
Approaching the Refugee Problem Today 26 (1987) (unpublished manuscript, available at
the Refugee Law Research Unit, Osgoode Hall Law School, Ontario, Canada). It has
been widely repeated. See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying
Promise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L LJ. 129, 160 (1990). A similar Coles paper,
this time using the phrase "exile bias," was published as Gervase Coles, Approaching
the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373, 397 (Gil
Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989). For a cautionary and skeptical account of the
shift away from exilic solutions, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, State-Centered Refugee
Law: From Resettlement to Containment, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 120 (1992).
Vol. 26
1993 Strategies for a Resistant World
choices. The one-interdiction- simply bottles up refugees, while the
other focuses on the hard task of fostering internal change in the source
country or region.3
I. Background: The Road to Interdiction
A brief review of the development of modern international refugee law
helps in understanding current challenges and alternatives.
A. From the League of Nations Through the 1967 Protocol
The League of Nations established the first High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees in 1921, in response to the uprooting of people by revolution in
Russia and the collapse of the Ottoman empire. Then, as fascism took
root and spread in the 1930s, various initiatives were proposed to
extend a protective umbrella to new populations in desperate need.
Governments responded with legalisms, however, and showed an unre-
lenting preoccupation with the Depression's effect on their own people.
The history of refugee policy from 1930 to 1945 is a depressing tale of
callousness and evasion. 4
When the full story of Nazi atrocities and genocide was revealed at
the end of World War II, shame at the earlier failures spurred more
enduring post-war efforts. Immigration countries, which had resisted
movements in the 1930s, offered major resettlement opportunities to
the displaced persons left scattered throughout Europe in the war's
aftermath. The United States even bent its national origins quota
scheme to resettle some 350,000 displaced persons in the late 1940s.
5
Shame also led to determined, if measured, efforts after the war to
provide a better legal and institutional framework for refugee protec-
tion. The General Assembly created the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950, to replace the
International Refugee Organization, which had foundered on Cold War
shoals.6 Then, in 1951, a United Nations-sponsored conference
adopted the well-known Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees. 7 It propounded a now widely used definition of "refugee," based
centrally on the notion of a "well-founded fear of persecution" in the
home country, and it established a strong nonrefoulement guarantee in
3. Of course, there are many ways of doing the latter, through a host of possible
human rights initiatives, short of the maximal exertion represented by armed
intervention.
4. See MICHAEL MARRUS, THE UNWANTED: EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN THE TWENTI-
rH CENTURY 122-295 (1985).
5. GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND
AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945-PRESENT 2 (1986).
6. G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at46, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950). See LouISE HOLBORN, 1 REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME 57 (1975).
7. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention].
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Article 33, applicable to all refugees present in the haven country, not
just those who had achieved a fully regular legal status.
These are important advances, and one often hears high-flown rhet-
oric praising the 1951 Convention-calling it, for example, the Magna
Carta of refugee law. If we subject the treaty to a closer look, however,
we have to recognize it as a deeply cautious document. Its drafters did
not want to issue a "blank cheque" (a phrase that recurs throughout the
travaux prparatoires) to future refugee movements.8 They applied the
Convention's guarantees only to those who were refugees "as a result of
events" predating 1951 9-- in principle a knowable and finite group of
beneficiaries.1 0 They enabled state parties to confine their obligations
to European refugees, although they did make the treaty capable of
expansion, at a party's option, beyond the European continent."1
Above all, the drafters expressly avoided making the document a treaty
about asylum.' 2 State parties do not pledge to provide the full range of
residence, employment, and other rights we would associate with a state
of durable asylum, even to those aliens who demonstrate that they meet
the refugee definition. Such rights and entitlements must await a further
discretionary decision by the state of refuge to legalize their status. As
its title reflects, the 1951 Convention is a treaty about status for persons
already somehow accepted in the territory, not a treaty about asylum or
admission.
Some of the caution manifested in the 1951 drafting process was
gradually shed over the next two decades. As a result, legal guarantees
were expanded, modestly but importantly, by the 1967 Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees. Although the 1967 Protocol made no
changes in the 1951 Convention so as to mandate full asylum for
8. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.21 (1951), at 12 (statement of Mr. van
Heuven Goedhart, High Commissioner). See generally Hathaway, supra note 2, at 153-
54.
9. The Convention, in Art. 1(A)(2), defines "refugee" as any person who:
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him-
self of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention, supra note 7, art. l(A)(2) (emphasis added). The 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, now
accepted by nearly all parties to the Convention, served primarily to remove the itali-
cized language and hence to free the definition from temporal limitation.
10. The group was finite in principle only, because the category ultimately proved
expandable to include later groups, such as the Hungarians who fled the arrival of
Soviet tanks in 1956. It was ultimately judged that, although the flight occurred five
years after the dateline, it stemmed from events preceding 1951, including the impo-
sition of Communist rule on Hungary. See generally HOLBORN, supra note 6, at 394.
11. Convention, supra note 7, art. 1 (B).
12. See Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 105 (1983)
(Conference of Plenipotentiaries preferred to leave asylum to hortatory statements in
the Final Act of the Conference).
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nonregularized refugees, it did remove the 1951 dateline, which was by
then obsolescent, from the definition of "refugee." It also strongly
encouraged parties to opt for applying the treaty to both European and
non-European refugees.' 3
Why the changes? Why were states sufficiently relaxed in 1967 to
adopt a generalized and abstract definition of "refugee" not limited by
dateline, continent, or other group designation? The relaxation
resulted, I would submit, from the quieter times that prevailed on the
refugee front between 1951 and 1967, at least for the North Atlantic
countries that remained the leading players in deciding on legal
changes. Government leaders apparently assumed that any developing
refugee flows would remain numerically small and otherwise managea-
ble. In this climate, expanding legal guarantees did not awaken the old
concern about "blank cheques."
The reduced anxiety derives from two key factors. First, the num-
bers remained low because of certain seemingly natural barriers and
deterrents to the large-scale migration of oppressed or needy people, at
least to Europe or North America. Though upheavals in Asia and Africa
sometimes caused significant population shifts, distance kept the refu-
gees in the region of their origin. Air travel was too expensive to
become a likely avenue toward better refuge. Equally important, the
idea that haven might be possible in a distant but wealthy Western
nation simply had not worked its way through, except to a tiny and usu-
ally westernized or elite minority.
Expense and distance are not the full story, of course, because some
potential refugees were near the key European nations. They were
indeed the very groups for whom the international refugee machinery
initially had been designed: those from the Soviet Union and its satellite
states in Eastern Europe. But here too, from the vantage point of the
early 1960s, no major flows seemed at all likely. Home-country exit con-
trols obligingly spared the West any major influx, and hence any need to
think about the dirty business of entry controls or enforcement through
deportation. Barriers were part of the natural landscape and did not
have to be the result of deliberate and controversial government policy.
In the middle of the Cold War, these factors combined to calm govern-
ments enough that they could drop the dateline from the 1951 Conven-
tion and apply the legal guarantees to refugees from other continents.
A second reason for the reduced anxiety by 1967 was a high valida-
tion rate, reinforcing a sense of the almost self-verifying character of
refugee claims during this era. As long as numbers remained low, states
felt little impetus for probing the claim deeply; as long as most claimants
were refugees from Communism, the Cold War assured little disposition
for doing so. If someone had risked his life to escape the East's barbed
wire, or had put up with the privations of refugee camps elsewhere in
the world, it seemed churlish to doubt the seriousness of the claim. Ref-
13. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1(3).
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ugee recognition rates tended to be quite high, often exceeding ninety
percent. Hence there was little occasion for worrying about whether
nonrefugees were trying to claim the benefits of refugee status '4-bene-
fits that increasingly amounted to guaranteed asylum. Consequently,
receiving states essentially ignored the adjudication difficulties that
could be posed by the abstract and individualized refugee definition per-
fected in the 1967 Protocol. Problems in assessing the credibility of an
asylum applicant or gathering information about human rights condi-
tions in distant countries were simply obscured in an era when much of
asylum law focused on a relative handful of escapees from the Soviet
bloc.15
B. An Assessment
After adoption of the Protocol, then, refugee law may have seemed quite
robust and welcoming. The world had accepted an abstract, individual-
ized test, based on an assessment of threatened persecution in the
homeland and no longer confined by date or geography. Key states
were not inclined to apply the tests too stringently to asylum seekers. In
practice, those recognized as refugees received full asylum, even if they
had entered irregularly, not just the minimal nonrefoulement guarantee
that might have been their only clear right under the Convention. A
notably high percentage of those who arrived on the territory of West-
ern states and asked for asylum received it.
If we take a step back and examine these developments from a
wider perspective, however, we should be struck (although few have
been) by the moral oddity of the regime that resulted. From the stand-
point of the states agreeing to these guarantees, the policy set forth in
the 1967 Protocol is purely reactive. Rather than identifying persons
currently suffering from persecution and then designing measures that
might maximize global protection, given inevitable limits of resources,
power, and diplomatic capacity, the framework is essentially nonselec-
tive. It merely requires a qualified claimant to establish physical pres-
ence in the territory of a party to the Protocol, 16 and to show that he or
14. For further reflections on why this took place, see David A. Martin, The New
Asylum Seekers, in THE NEw ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAw IN THE 1980s, at 1, 9-11
(David A. Martin ed., 1988).
15. See generally Paul Weis, Convention Refugees and De Facto Refugees, in AFRICAN
REFUGEES AND THE LAW 15 (G~ran Melander & Peter Nobel eds., 1978):
As one who has participated in the drafting of the convention, I can say that
the drafters did not have specific restrictions in mind when they used this
terminology. Theirs was an effort to express in legal terms what is generally
considered as a political refugee. The Convention was drafted at a time when
the cold war was at its height. The drafters thought mainly of the refugees
from Eastern Europe and they had no doubt that these refugees fulfilled the
definition they had drafted.
16. I do not exclude the possibility that the Protocol applies in some limited cir-
cumstances to state action outside the national territory. However, in this era such
issues generally did not arise; the focus was on persons who reached the haven state's
territory, narrowly understood.
Vol 26
1993 Strategies for a Resistant World
she passes the "well-founded fear" threshold, which was not then ordi-
narily very demanding. The provision of such protection is reactive and
accidental, for the treaty is agnostic about how its beneficiaries establish
the physical presence that calls the guarantees into play. Nothing is
done about conditions that may have sent the refugees outside their bor-
ders, and nothing is done about other threatened persons who may
remain behind, facing exactly the same, or indeed worse, threats-
unless, of course, entirely on their own they find their way to the terri-
tory of the haven state.
In many ways then, the treaty is a "clean hands" document, not a
human rights instrument. It memorializes the purity of state parties, to
ensure that they will escape the taint of any responsibility so direct and
visible as that involved in sending someone back to a place where he or
she is persecuted. But in the process, it downplays responsibility for
failure to act systematically to end ongoing persecution in situ, back in
the home country. A typical account of the treaty regime describes its
effects in these words: "International protection of refugees is interna-
tional law's substitute for the protection that the refugee's country of ori-
gin cannot or will not provide." 17 If concerted international action is
thus mobilized, however, why simply cobble together a substitute for
what the home state should be doing? Why not act instead to reestab-
lish that state's own protection or to create a substitute protection on
the victim's home territory? Why, in any case, apply international action
only to an accidental group of beneficiaries, rather than selecting those
in greatest need?
A major part of the answer, of course, lies in a lack of the political
power or influence that would be needed to induce or support such
changes in the home country's policies. The answer in that era also
drew upon a recognition of inadequate military capacity to enforce such
changes, particularly in the polarized world of the Cold War where vari-
ous oppressive regimes found shelter under the protective wings of their
chosen superpower, while the United Nations Security Council
remained deadlocked.
Another important factor, which should not be overlooked, is the
conceptual poverty of classical international law. Even to think of set-
ting things right at home, rather than crafting substitute protections
elsewhere, collided with a bulwark concept of traditional, positivist
international law: "sovereignty." The United Nations was forbidden by
its Charter "to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state."18 A state's treatment of its own citi-
zens was of course viewed as a cardinal realm of that sovereign's domes-
tic jurisdiction. Although the United Nations Charter did contain some
provisions that looked toward international consideration of human
17. Barry N. Stein, The Nature of the Refugee Problem, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 48 (Alan E. Nash ed., 1988)
(emphasis added).
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
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rights, during this era only general standard-setting, in a highly abstract
fashion that pointed no fingers at violating states., was considered possi-
ble. Even the Commission on Human Rights decided at its first session
that it had no right to consider individual petitions alleging abuses.1 9
Until 1970, the United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution
covering such petitions provided only for their intricately ceremonious
burial, including an express mandate for the Secretariat to inform the
petitioners that "the Commission has no power to take any action in
regard to any complaint concerning human rights."'20 No wonder the
victims of persecution had to engage in self-help to cross a national
frontier before the refugee treaties held out any hope of legitimate inter-
national assistance.
C. The 1970s and 1980s: Weaknesses Revealed
Events in the 1970s and especially the early 1980s revealed weaknesses
in some of the assumptions that had eased adoption of the Protocol.
Primarily, the old (seemingly natural and perpetual) barriers and deter-
rents diminished. Transportation became cheaper. The refugee option,
including possibilities for opening up distant havens, became better
known, perhaps in part because of the successful resettlement efforts
adopted for those fleeing Indochina, who had attracted considerable
media attention. Entrepreneurs got into the act, scouting out weak-
nesses in entry controls, organizing trips, and advising on how to claim
asylum and so defeat quick repulse upon arrival (including the spread-
ing practice of destroying travel documents). As the numbers of claim-
ants rose, slowly through the 1970s, then with increasing momentum in
the 1980s, public resistance grew, and suspicions about the new arrivals'
claims mounted. As a result, the old "blank cheque" concerns reap-
peared in a different form but with new intensity.
In principle, the legal regime offered a straightforward way to
resolve these suspicions and concerns, protect those asylum seekers who
deserved it, and rebuff the rest: simply adjudicate their claims to refugee
status. But the old adjudication difficulties, submerged when the vast
majority of the claimants were approved, suddenly became apparent to
government leaders. They learned how difficult it is to assess the credi-
bility of a claimant from another culture, especially when other wit-
nesses to the events of which she speaks are unavailable. They learned
how poorly equipped their agencies were to collect useful information
about human rights abuses in the countries of origin. And they discov-
ered that they had to become more sophisticated conceptually, in order
to determine just what is "persecution" and when a fear of it is "well
founded." UNHCR responded to some of these realizations and finally
promulgated a Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
19. See Report of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No.
3, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/259, at para. 22 (1947).
20. Communications Concerning Human Rights, ESC Res. 728F, U.N. ESCOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/3290 (1959).
Vol 26
1993 Strategies for a Resistant World
Status, which is now widely used.21 The rather tardy appearance of this
volume reveals much about the dynamics of refugee law. Though
receiving states had supposedly been applying the definition since 1954,
when the treaty entered into force, they apparently felt little need for
detailed technical guidance from UNHCR on the standards and criteria
until the 1970s, when the handbook question was first seriously taken up
by the Executive Committee. This timing suggests that theretofore the
states had not considered carefully the need to use the treaty to deny
asylum systematically to unqualified applicants. The Handbook itself
finally appeared in 1979, twenty-eight years after the criteria it explains
were initially adopted.
More importantly, government leaders discovered that their adjudi-
cation procedures were poorly designed. Multiple layers of considera-
tion and review made little difference when most people's claims were
approved, and when the public cared little if the rest wound up staying.
But when rejection rates rose, the inability to remove those who did not
qualify fed cynicism and backlash.
Governments reacted in three ways: making incremental improve-
ments in fact finding capacities, narrowing the de facto standards (while
still formally applying the Convention definition), and proposing more
streamlined procedures. The first step gained widespread support,
although-or perhaps because-its impact on determinations and on
the public controversy is modest. The other two, however, touched off
continued battles. Restrictive application was challenged in the courts.
Some judicial decisions, including the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,22 made headway in preserving a more
generous application, although the more recent judicial trend is prob-
lematic. 23 Streamlined procedures were challenged in court on due
process grounds, as well as through intense lobbying that sometimes
obscured the real stakes. 24
These early victories fed a misguided optimism about maximalist
advocacy. Governments may want to restrict, the feeling seemed to be,
but courts in rights-conscious liberal societies would not let them get
21. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PRO-
CEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVEN-
TION AND 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, U.N. Doc. HCR/
PRO/4 (Geneva, 1979) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]. A second edition
appeared in 1988.
22. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
23. Some cases seem now to allow or even promote a capricious restrictiveness.
The Supreme Court's latest offering, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), is
typical, applying the doctrine in a wooden way that ignores the underlying purposes
of refugee law.
24. For an account of lobbying that forced quick abandonment of a set of regula-
tions proposed by the Justice Department in 1987, see David A. Martin, Reforming
Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1320-
24 (1990).
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away with it.25 Hard-hitting advocacy, covered intensely by the media,
would force the government to back down on returning certain unsuc-
cessful applicants. Moreover, well-targeted lobbying might force execu-
tive officials to retreat from proposals to streamline procedures.
D. The Exposed Flank of Refugee Advocacy
While advocates prevailed (unevenly) on the central front, regarding
procedures and legal standards for those already in the asylum adjudica-
tion system, they neglected their flank. Indeed, their victories redou-
bled the incentives for government officials to target their energies on
other means of reducing asylum pressures-in ways that courts were less
likely to control and that were less susceptible to lobbying or media cov-
erage. That is, governments returned to the idea of barriers and deter-
rents. No longer a function of natural factors like distance and expense,
nor a byproduct of source-country ideologies, barriers and deterrents
would now have to be recreated by deliberate government action. Gov-
ernments turned to austere housing, jail-like detention, lengthy periods
of enforced idleness without work authorization, and other
discouragements .26
Probably more devastating, and certainly less readily subject to
court review, governments instituted methods that might prevent the
arrival of asylum seekers. Europe has adopted American-style visa
regimes, enforced by transportation companies, and the EC is now
implementing a coordinated visa policy. In a new policy invention,, both
Europe and the United States have persuaded countries further south to
prevent the onward migration of illegal migrants or to return those who
do get through. Mexico has performed this role for several years and
now receives express U.S. funding for the function. 27 Morocco is a
more recent participant, but it expects improved relations with the EC in
return. 28 Although both efforts are described as programs to halt illegal
migrants, it is obvious that both are fueled by worry about new arrivals
25. See James Hollifield, Immigration-Related Problems and the Issues Facing the EC on
the Road to 1992, in 14 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 73 (Center for Migration Studies
1991); see generally JAMES HOLLIFIELD, IMMIGRANTS, MARKETS, AND STATES 169-213
(1992) (comparative analysis of immigration and civil rights and liberties in France,
Germany, and United States).
26. See Martin, supra note 14, at 7.
27. BILL FRELICK, RUNNING THE GAUNTLET: THE CENTRAL AMERICAN JOURNEY
THROUGH MEXICO (U.S. Comm. for Refugees Issue Paper, Jan. 1991); Departments
of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-395, Title V, 106 Stat. 1828, 1864 (Oct. 6, 1992) (ear-
marks $350,000 for State Department payments to the Mexican government to
deport third-country nationals interdicted in Mexico).
28. William Drozdiak, Morocco Bars Smugglers' Gate to Europe, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
1993, at A20. One Spanish official described Morocco's "surprisingly good" cooper-
ation: "The Moroccans now take back anybody who crosses to our side without
proper papers, and they assume responsibility for sending them back to their native
country." Id. at A24.
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who would clog the target states' ineffective and overburdened asylum
adjudication systems.
The ultimate barrier is the interdiction policy first introduced by the
Reagan administration in 1981, which then escalated to its most destruc-
tive form by President Bush in May 1992.29 Under the Bush order, Hai-
tian boats were stopped on the high seas, and all passengers were
returned to Haiti, with no effort whatever to assess whether any might
have reason to fear persecution upon return. President Clinton prop-
erly leveled sharp criticism at this order during the campaign, calling the
return program "appalling."'s0 But if proof were needed of the unrelia-
bility of our ordinary asylum system-the alternative that in principle is
available as a more humane way to handle claimants from Haiti-Clin-
ton provided it onJanuary 14, 1993. That day, after a full staff review of
policy options, he surprisingly announced that he would extend the
Bush policy, at least on a temporary basis.3 ' It is still possible, though
unlikely, that the Supreme Court will declare the 1992 version of
interdiction unlawful; the case was argued March 2, 1993.32 But
whatever the Court's judgment, the overall picture for refugee law in the
West is not encouraging, precisely because of the new prominence given
to strategies of deterrence and repulse.
H. Alternatives that May Still Help Limit the Outflow
These troubles on the refugee law landscape appeared to reduce the
possibilities for using relocation to a foreign land-exile-as a solution
to problems of persecution or other forms of oppression or deprivation.
Reducing the "exilic bias" is not necessarily a bad thing, however, if
other means open up to address the underlying evils. Some such means
have appeared on the horizon, quite unexpectedly.
A. Humanitarian Intervention
In the late 1980s, as governments were refining their barriers and deter-
rents, a funny thing happened. The Cold War ended. Hopes began to
reemerge for the kinds of global action against aggression and oppres-
sion that the United Nations had been designed to undertake. In the
midst of this new and hazy dawn of awareness of a new potential for the
UN, Saddam Hussein helped clear the clouds away. He presented the
world with a provocation so flagrant that leaders could scarcely avoid
29. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1988); Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). The 1981 interdiction
policy was implemented along with other deterrent initiatives, especially a wider use
of detention of newly arrived asylum applicants. See THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID
A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 833-36 (2d ed. 1991).
30. See Ruth Marcus & Al Kamen, Aides Say Clinton IVill Extend Polity on Returning
Haitians, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1993, at A25.
31. Ruth Marcus, Clinton Besieged About Policy Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at
Al.
32. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 969 F.2d 1350, cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
52, argued (Mar. 2, 1993).
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dusting off the Security Council's little used powers under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter to respond to the invasion of Kuwait.3 3
Although President Bush sometimes showcased Iraqi human rights
abuses in Kuwait as a reason to support the military effort there, the
Gulf War might have served, in precedential terms, only as a classic
defense of the nation-state system, a reinforcement of the usual under-
standing of sovereignty. After all, Iraqi forces had marched across an
internationally recognized boundary, and gravely intervened in domes-
tic jurisdiction by displacing the government of Kuwait.
But the new activism, once loosed, proved to have a wider reach.
Shortly after the Gulf War's end, Saddam's efforts to crush internal
rebellion touched off such an outpouring of global sympathy for his vic-
tims, particularly the Kurds in the north, that global action was
demanded. Few of the usual legal objections were heard when the coali-
tion forces joined in creating a safe haven in northern Iraq in April
1991. More objections surfaced recently when the United States sought
to use the arguable authority of the earlier Security Council resolutions
to enforce a no-fly zone in the south of Iraq.34 Nevertheless, the whole
experience has transformed "humanitarian intervention" from an
obscure and rather wistful topic for professors of international human
rights into a buzzword for the op-ed pages.
World action of this sort is now an available option for responding
to a host of troubling post-Cold War international crises. President
Bush, of all people, helped prove that humanitarian intervention has
wider application than simply in circumstances where the target nation
once committed classic cross-border aggression. Bush was an unlikely
candidate for this role; his great reluctance to aid the Kurds through any
use of U.S. military power had been obvious in the bitter spring of 1991.
Nevertheless, in his final major foreign initiative, Bush proposed a sur-
prising humanitarian foray into Somalia in December 1992, to end star-
vation and restore a modicum of order. Significantly, he worked this
time to assure that the action received express UN sanction under the
Security Council's Chapter VII powers.3 5
B. Other Human Rights Initiatives
These events of the 1990s merely provided a capstone to a decades-long
effort to legitimize international human rights initiatives. We therefore
now inhabit a world of international law where the conceptual structure
has been significantly revised, as compared with 1951. The domain of
33. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., at 27, U.N. Doc. S1
INF/46 (1990) (resolution of Nov. 29, 1990) (providing a mandate to the military
coalition against Iraq).
34. SeeJulia Preston, U.S. Raids Test U.N. 's Crisis Power, WASH. PosT,Jan. 22, 1993,
at A29.
35. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., at 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
794 (1992). A collection of relevant statements and resolutions on the Somalia crisis
appears in 3 U.S. DEP'T oF STATE DISPATCH 877-84 (1992).
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matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," to use
the terminology of Article 2(7) of the Charter, has been sharply dimin-
ished.3 6 Now the UN as a whole, as well as separate states, regional
organizations, and international institutions, may discuss a wider range
of formerly internal matters, and use various instruments of diplomacy,
persuasion, and overt pressure to serve humanitarian ends. "Sover-
eignty" no longer holds as much power, especially when it is deployed
to shield a state's mistreatment or abysmal neglect of its own citizens.
To be sure, sovereignty will still be invoked and discussed, but it has
become more of a ritualistic incantation, not necessarily expected to
have operative force, rather than the winning trump played in previous
decades.
With the conceptual barriers lowered, the world community is grad-
ually gaining experience with novel techniques meant to improve the
situation at home. For example, international election observers are
now routinely deployed to help monitor, and perhaps ultimately to help
legitimize, election contests in countries where democracy is new or
newly restored.3 7 This precedent has now been expanded to include
sending teams of international human rights monitors even when no
election is in the offing.3 8 And some are beginning to recognize the
potential for human rights protection that may go hand-in-hand with a
more traditional humanitarian assistance presence.3 9
C. Further Legal Implications
Practice now establishes that the UN Security Council may choose to use
its maximum authority under Chapter VII of the Charter for candid
humanitarian ends, rather than solely for classic reasons of collective
security. Refugee flows played a crucial role in that legal evolution, for
they were the obvious foundation for the Security Council's pivotal deci-
36. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 238-39 (3d ed. 1991); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 293-94, 553-54 (4th ed. 1990).
37. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 63-77 (1992).
38. This appears to be a key part of the newly invigorated UN diplomacy aimed at
Haiti, under the leadership of former Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo.
The policy is already being implemented in advance of any agreement either on
return of the Aristide regime or other way of restoring democracy (such as through
new elections). Some 150 monitors, deployed by the Organization of American
States, and working in cooperation with the UN, were in place in Haiti in April 1993,
and reports indicated that up to 500 such monitors may eventually be sent, to take up
stations throughout the country. See Howard W. French, Edgy Haitian Town, Civil
Rights Monitors Ease the Fear a Bit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1993, at A3; Michael Tarr, Rights
Monitors Quickly Find Role in Embattled Northern Haitian City, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1993,
at A22; Michael Tarr, Observers Arrive in Haiti, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1993, at A35.
39. See, e.g., Mr. Human Rights, ECONOMIST, Dec. 26, 1992, at 57, 60. The
UNHCR's 1992 Note on International Protection, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/799 (1992),
explores innovative ideas for monitoring and "safety zones" within the home country
as part of a strategy of "prevention." High Commissioner Ogata has also empha-
sized in public remarks the "right to remain" and "the right not to become a refu-
gee." The Right to Remain, REFUGEES, Apr. 1993, at 11.
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sion to condemn Iraq's repression of the Kurds in terms that ostensibly
fit the entire humanitarian endeavor within the framework of Chapter
VII. Under Article 39, the coercive Chapter VII powers of the Security
Council may be used only when the Council finds a "threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression." This catalogue seems to
address only hard-eyed security concerns; human rights abuses and
other humanitarian aims are mentioned only in other parts of the Char-
ter, in noncoercive contexts. 40 Some weighty contenders in earlier bat-
tles over the reach of Chapter VII powers (particularly when they were
used to impose an embargo on Britain's breakaway Rhodesian colony)
had forcefully challenged the legitimacy of considering any humanita-
rian factors under this provision.4 '
Against this background, the first operative paragraph in the key
Security Council resolution (Resolution 688) on treatment of the Kurds
is of crucial importance: "[The Security Council] Condemns the repres-
sion of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including
most recently in the Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which
threaten international peace and security in the region."'4 2 The emphasized
phrase plainly refers to the massive refugee flows Iraq had triggered (to
both Turkey, which resisted, and Iran, which generally permitted
entry).43 After Resolution 688, Security Council practice makes clear
that Article 39's formula can be invoked in settings far different from the
acts or threats of aggression classically understood. And although Reso-
lution 688 is somewhat elliptic (it never expressly states that the Security
Council is acting under Chapter VII), it has served as the foundation for
the coalition forces' legal justification of their role in Operation Provide
Comfort and its aftermath. 44
Having leapt the conceptual divide from classic cross-border
aggression to more humanitarian grounds for finding a "threat to the
peace" in April 1991, the UN later has found use of coercive authority
for human rights or humanitarian reasons far easier. Security Council
40. See Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 190 (L. Damrosch & D.
Scheffer eds., 1991). Farer provides an illuminating, concise account of the ongoing
debate between "classicists" and "realists" over whether Chapter VII may be used
for wider purposes. On this point I side with the so-called realists in supporting a
greater weight for subsequent practice.
41. See, e.g., Dean Acheson, The Arrogance of International Lawyers, 2 INT'L LAW. 591
(1968) (a classic and witty statement of a short-sighted and ungenerous position, by
the former Secretary of State). For the opposing view, see, e.g., Myres S. McDougal
& W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness ofInternational
Concern, 62 AM.J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1968).
42. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991) (emphasis added).
43. This point is made even clearer in the debates that preceded adoption. See
United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand
Nine Hundred and Eighty-Second Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2982 (1991).
44. See, e.g., 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 273 (1991) (statement of President
Bush); id. at 275-76 (statement of Princeton Lyman, Director, Bureau of Refugee
Programs).
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Resolution 794,45 which authorized Operation Restore Hope in
Somalia, is emblematic of the new situation. The preamble approves
"the Secretary General's assessment that the situation in Somalia is
intolerable," and goes on to announce the Security Council's formal
determination that "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the
conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created
to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to
international peace and security." 46 On this groundwork, and this time
expressly "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter," the resolution
then authorizes the Secretary-General and member states to "use all
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."
47
Today the world is certainly in the business of intervening, under
UN authority, for humanitarian reasons. 48 The debate has largely
shifted from the legal question of legitimacy to operational questions
about the likely effectiveness of various forms of international presence,
their respective costs, and the prospects for ultimate disengagement.
49
The old reticence has not completely departed, nor should it, for some
invocations of "sovereignty" are clumsy proxies for a justifiable notion
of national self-determination. Obviously the world community should
not override local authority except for powerful reasons. But at least
now the weight of those reasons, including purely humanitarian reasons,
can be discussed candidly and then balanced against local interests in
light of limits on effective power and diplomacy.
These are hopeful developments, for they may, at least in some cir-
cumstances, offset the hardships created or perpetuated by the barriers
and deterrents that states are erecting toward refugee claimants. If
western nations will not provide a solution through exile, then perhaps
they will seize these other options. Receiving states who feel
45. S.C. Res. 794, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
Although refugee flows are not expressly mentioned in this Resolution providing
Chapter VII authority for the U.S. intervention in Somalia, the resolution was
adopted at a time when cross-border refugee flows to Kenya had reached major pro-
portions, increasing resistance on the part of the host population. See Kenya Refugee
Population Reaches 400,000 with No End in Sight, REFUGEE REPORTS, Oct. 30, 1992, at15.
46. S.C. Res 794, supra note 45, at 17.
47. Id.
48. See generally Farer, supra note 40, at 185; Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights
and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAw AND FORCE, supra note 40, at 202; Lori Fisler
Damrosh, Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights, in LAw
AND FORCE, supra note 40, at 215; and the essays in To LoosE THE BANDS OF WICKED-
NESS: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGrrS (Nigel Rodley ed.,
1992).
49. All these considerations are subject, of course, to one ultimate constraint; a
proposed Chapter VII action must always stay within the tolerances imposed by the
interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council, each of which
retains a veto power. (In the activist period we are now experiencing, China is gener-
ally regarded as the most skeptical power-the one most likely to wield a veto if
intervention strays too far.) Nevertheless, the UN has managed to be active on an
unprecedented scale and has not encountered a veto sinceJune 1, 1990.
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overburdened by refugee flows can use that precise transnational impact
as one basis for legitimizing their efforts to go to the source, to
encourage (through human rights diplomacy) or sometimes require
(through humanitarian intervention when the case is extreme) an end to
repression in the source country. And they need not wait until people
are on the move. International action on behalf of persecuted individu-
als is now clearly legitimate, even before they manage, through some
unspoken form of self-help, to escape across an international frontier.
Some of the energy and resources that once went into battles over a
haven state's effort to provide for refugees can now be harnessed for
more systematic and well-thought-out efforts to maximize protection for
threatened people, whether or not they have yet crossed a border.
D. The Continuing Risks from a Regime of Barriers: An End to
Signalling and Inducement
What I have just sketched is the hopeful way of portraying future reac-
tions to refugee flows. But here optimism and pessimism are in a close
race, for barriers to refugee flows may have a more insidious impact on
the future use of vigorous human rights initiatives.
Refugee flows have been important not only because of the way
they have triggered a conceptual breakthrough, breaching the artificial
walls of sovereignty that once pretended that oppression inside a coun-
try was no one else's business. They have been important for another,
far more pragmatic reason. Asylum seekers, even if their claims ulti-
mately fall short of the legal standards for winning full political asylum,
have served a vital signalling function. Their arrival in significant num-
bers forces the media, the public, and the political elite in the receiving
state to take notice of the poverty or abuses in the home state that may
have triggered the flow. Beyond this, a desire to reduce the burdens and
expenses associated with asylum claims-including adjudication costs,
care and maintenance, and friction with the local population-can feed
into efforts to bring relief or find solutions in the home country. The
objective is to reduce future migration, or to encourage voluntary
returns, or perhaps only to make more palatable the forced return of
those whose claims are rejected by the asylum adjudication system,
because the home state's situation is becoming demonstrably better. All
these factors amount to " 'selfish' national interest reasons" for human
rights policy, to use a phrase introduced by Richard Bilder in 1974.50
Selfish reasons may be troubling, but they are better than no reasons at
all, and they are probably more effective than reasons built solely on
altruistic appeals.
In the 1980s, these processes were evident in the United States
regarding Central American asylum seekers, and in Europe for Sri
Lankan Tamils. Human rights abuses in the home countries stayed on
50. Richard Bilder, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Short-Term Prospects, 14
VA.J. INT'L L. 597, 608 (1974).
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the policy agenda, in major part because of the receiving states' strug-
gles with the challenges posed by large numbers of asylum seekers. This
effect occurred even though most of those claimants were ultimately
deemed not to fit the Convention refugee definition. A similar process
also unfolded for Haitians from the time of the first post-coup outflow in
October 1991 until May 1992, when President Bush's order brought an
abrupt and near-total halt to further outflows. The Supreme Court's
preliminary approval of Bush's harsh action, however (when it stayed
the Second Circuit's injunction),5 1 dropped Haiti to a low-priority
issue-a status it maintained throughout the presidential election cam-
paign. If inertia pulls President Clinton into keeping Haitian interdic-
tion in place indefinitely, we may well see a similar draining of interest
and priority from efforts to reinstate a democratic government in Haiti.
Here is where the increasingly sophisticated proliferation of barri-
ers to the arrival of asylum seekers may pose its greatest threat. If U.S.
interdiction teaches the world that insulation from a refugee flow can be
achieved unilaterally without having to address the underlying causes,
much of the fire may go out of humanitarian efforts and human rights
diplomacy. 52 Hence it is important to remove interdiction as a policy
tool, not only because of its impact on the threatened individuals who
might seek to escape-though that is clearly a worthy reason that should
not be lost from view. 53 Removing that option is also vital in order to
51. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 3 (1992) (staying the injunc-
tion issued by the court of appeals at 969 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1992)). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari shortly thereafter, 113 S.Ct. 52 (1992), and oral argument
was heard on March 2, 1993.
52. I worry that this will be the lesson that the world takes from President Clin-
ton's perpetuation of interdiction, especially if it is sustained by the Supreme Court,
even though the Clinton Administration itself may confound the analysis offered
here. That is, Clinton appears to be sustaining a much more vigorous human rights
diplomacy aimed at the military government in Haiti, involving the UN and not sim-
ply the Organization of American States, even without the stimulus that an ongoing
mass exodus would doubtless provide. See Ben Barber, Clinton Turns Up Heat on
Haiti's Military Regime, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 7, 1993, at 3; Howard W.
French, Pact to Return Aristide to Haiti Is Called Near, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, at 17.
53. In-country refugee processing, touted by the Bush Administration (and more
recently by Clinton's) as an alternative mode of protection for Haitians, is not wholly
plausible as an avenue of protection, particularly for those who should be the princi-
pal objects of our concern-those who are the most clearly threatened, those who are
unmistakably viewed by the regime as dangerous opponents. Even if processing
expands to locations outside of Port-au-Prince, no applicant can have confidence in
his or her ability to make it safely into and out of the facility, and then the country.
These risks are compounded when the process is as slow and bureaucratic as the
early rounds of processing in Haiti reportedly have been. See Clinton Continues Sum-
mary Return of Haitians; U.S. Lawyers Investigate In-Country Processing, REFUGEE REPORTS,
Jan. 29, 1993, at 1.
This analysis also touches upon another central objection to interdiction, at least in
the extreme form now applied to Haiti. Interdiction with immediate return, even
when coupled with other human rights initiatives, blots out intermediate avenues of
protection (those purchased by the individuals involved at the initial price of contriv-
ing a self-help escape), even for the most gravely threatened. However important
human rights initiatives and in-country processing may be, they do not deal with "the
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keep the pressure on neighboring countries to go to the source, so that
they have immediate reasons to push for constructive change inside the
country whose misgovernment, oppression, or other severe suffering
sends people across the frontiers.
How can this be done? The Supreme Court could eliminate the
strongest form of interdiction merely by affirming the Second Circuit.
But its speedy stay of the lower court's injunction last summer leaves
little room for optimism. I believe instead that refugee activists will have
to adopt a longer-term strategy if interdiction is to be ended, through
political pressure and the offering of credible alternatives. Maximalist
advocacy will have to be curbed so that a fully functioning mainland asy-
lum system can finally be developed. It must be a system that readily
sorts meritorious claimants from those with insufficient claims. It must
curb the instinct to apply unrealistically expansive substantive standards.
Finally, it has to be able to deport, fairly promptly, those who do not
qualify.5 4 Only the availability of that sort of alternative-in actual prac-
tice and not just in principle-will begin to wean politicians away from
the worst forms of barriers and deterrents.
Conclusion
Such a strategy is admittedly counter-intuitive. It asks that we help give
the domestic asylum system a better capacity to say "no," so that the
executive branch can be coaxed into ending an interdiction policy that
basically just says "no" indiscriminately, at some point far from our bor-
ders, our media, and our courts. Such a paradoxical achievement may
be essential, however, if refugee flows are still to play the signalling and
inducement role they have developed in recent years. Comfortable
nations may need this ongoing stimulus if they are to use the new inter-
national legal regime to its maximum advantage, by pressing hard-
even sometimes through multilateral intervention-for human rights
improvements at the source.
meantime," as Bill Frelick so aptly phrases the matter in his contribution to this vol-
ume: "[Human rights initiatives] cannot be the sum total of a refugee policy. A refu-
gee policy is about what to do in the meantime, how to protect and assist people
outside their country while the country of origin is still dangerous." Bill Frelick,
Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of Refugee Protection,
26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 675 (1993).
54. See generally Martin, supra note 24, at 1287-94.
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